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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues for the relevance of rules in aesthetics by aligning and exploring the ways in 
which Kant and Wittgenstein treat the judgment of beauty. While both acknowledge that a 
subjective, felt response to something particular is an indispensable condition for a judgment of 
beauty, they also connect the judgment of beauty to the notion of a rule. However, the rules in 
question are not conceptual formulas, nor do they regulate the aesthetic or the artistic from without. 
Instead, the judgment of beauty itself is offered as an example of a rule. As such, the judgment of 
beauty provides a model of the kind of a judgment that may be treated as normative in spite of 
lacking a conceptual justification. For both Kant and Wittgenstein, the availability of such a 
subjectively based yet normative judgment is essential for making sense of cognition in general. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ludwig Wittgenstein is not known for a thorough philosophical discussion of beauty. If anything, 
he is famous for claiming that the word “beauty” is overused in aesthetics, and that the traditional 
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emphasis on beauty as a uniform property has only served to make the field of aesthetics confused 
(LC I:1). Wittgenstein recommends that we look instead at real aesthetic controversies and 
enquiries: “not what philosophers think it is like; but how e.g. musicians use ‘beautiful’, if they use 
it at all, in a discussion” (M 9:19). In Wittgenstein’s view, we will find words such as “right” and 
“correct” far more central in those discussions than “beauty” (LC I:8). But while the notion of 
beauty does not figure dominantly in Wittgenstein’s well-known lectures on aesthetics from 1938, 
in the recently published notes on his lectures delivered in Cambridge in 1933, Wittgenstein’s 
central ideas are expressed by reference to beauty. In these lectures, Wittgenstein makes a remark 
that is recorded by G.E. Moore as follows: 
“Beautiful” ≠ “agreeable”, I said: but I omitted to say: Man might answer: Surely it is 
agreeable, or you wouldn’t go to hear it? But you can say: I’m not going, not because 
it isn’t agreeable, but because I can’t stand its greatness: i.e. if anything, it is 
disagreeable. (M 9:26.) 
For any reader of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, Wittgenstein’s statement rings 
a familiar bell. This is because Kant’s analytic of the beautiful begins by an elucidation of beauty, 
not as a property of objects, but as a judgment that is qualitatively different from judgments of the 
agreeable. Kant argues that a judgment of beauty is founded upon a subjective response to a 
sensible manifold and, in this respect, resembles judgments of the agreeable. However, by contrast 
to judgments of the agreeable, a judgment of beauty is made with a special normative force, which 
Kant expresses by reference to the notion of a rule. While a judgment of beauty is not based on 
conceptual rules nor leads to them, Kant argues that the judgment itself is offered “as an example of 
a universal rule that one cannot produce” (CPJ 5:237). Indeed, the judgment itself makes a claim to 
necessity: when making a judgment of beauty I claim that the relation between the form of the 
object and my pleasure is necessary and not merely actual as in the case of the agreeable (CPJ 
5:213).  
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We find the same puzzling combination of commitments in Wittgenstein’s work. On the 
one hand, Wittgenstein claims that “Perhaps the most important thing in connection to aesthetics is 
what may be called aesthetic reactions, e.g., discontent, discomfort, disgust” (LC II:10). These are 
personal responses to particular features of artworks or other objects of aesthetic appreciation, and 
what elicits my discontent may not invite the same response in you. And yet, just like Kant, 
Wittgenstein argues that judgments of beauty – or what he later simply calls aesthetic judgments – 
differ from judgments about the agreeable by making a claim to correctness or even necessity (M 
9:13–9:26; LC I:8, II:3). Moreover, he illustrates the normativity of the judgments by reference to 
rules. Wittgenstein states: “If I hadn’t learnt the rules I wouldn’t be able to make the aesthetic 
judgment” (LC I:15). But rather than being conceptual rule-formulations, Wittgenstein suggests that 
the rules in question are given in the works of art and aesthetics judgments rather than dictated by 
an external source (LC I:12, 32).  
In the following, I will address the tension between the two seemingly contradictory 
claims, namely, the claim evoking aesthetic norms and the claim about a personal response as a sine 
qua non of a judgment of beauty. I will start by exploring Kant's account of these two poles of 
judgments of beauty. I will then argue that Wittgenstein’s treatment of aesthetic judgments follows 
quite faithfully Kant’s account of beauty. Moreover, I will argue that Wittgenstein’s reasons for 
treating aesthetic judgments as judgments that bring together the subjective and the normative are 
distinctly Kantian: for both, the judgment of beauty provides a model of the kind of a judgment that 
may be treated as normative in spite of lacking a conceptual justification. As such, it complements 
the account of cognition or understanding as the application of conceptual rules. But importantly, 
while Wittgenstein follows Kant in treating judgments of beauty as normative and as such 
implicating a need for criteria of correctness, Wittgenstein’s version of the argument does not 
require the postulation of mental faculties with immutable a priori principles. By locating the rules 
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in practices rather than a fixed mental architecture, Wittgenstein offers a less demanding version of 
the normativist conception of a judgment of beauty.   
 
II. KANT ON RULES IN COGNITION 
 
Kant’s critical project was to draw the limits of different types of judgment, determined by their 
respective sets of rules, principles, or laws. Indeed, according to Kant, for there to be an intelligible 
domain of reality at all, it must be governed by rules. For Kant, the paradigm example of a rule is a 
concept (CPR A106–108).1 We can come to agreement on matters of empirical fact, because we all 
share the same mental architecture of conceptual categories of understanding, characterized by Kant 
as the faculty of rules (CPR A132). Similarly, every rational action is governed by a maxim that 
may, in turn, be tested against a formal principle (the Categorical Imperative). The specific twist of 
Kant’s position, transcendental idealism, lies in the fact that we ourselves are the relevant 
lawgivers. Pure concepts of understanding and the principles of practical reason are not given to us 
by God or by nature, but originate in the structure of our own faculties. And this just means that the 
relevant rules are not regulative rules dictated from an external standpoint, but constitutive of the 
very possibility of thought. According to Kant, “We cannot think, we cannot use our understanding, 
except according to certain rules” (JL, 12). This overarching emphasis on rules stems from Kant’s 
general concern with the validity of our judgments. The appeal to rules originating in our own 
faculties, allows him to disarm skepticism arising from empiricism as well as provide an account of 
free agency where the possibility of self-determination rests on our ability to give ourselves 
representations of rules that transcend our natural condition.  
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant sets out to give an account of the possibility of 
cognitive judgments about the facts of nature. In Kant’s view, such judgments always bring together 
form and content. The form is given by the rules of understanding. The representational content is, 
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in turn, provided by our sensibility, characterized by Kant as mere receptivity (CPJ 5:205). 
According to Kant, both elements are indispensable for the possibility of cognition. Without 
intuitions, concepts remain empty, he writes. And conversely, without concepts, intuitions remain 
blind (CPR A51). In a cognitive judgment, then, the sensible particular is subsumed under a 
determinate concept of understanding, the point being that the concept determines the particular 
under its scope.  
However, the co-operation between understanding and sensibility, as the key faculties 
involved in cognition, is anything but peaceful. In his lectures on logic, Kant expresses the tension 
by reference to imagination as follows: “Imagination and understanding are two friends who cannot 
do without one another but cannot stand one another either, for one always harms the other. The 
more universal the understanding is in its rules, the more perfect it is, but if it wants to consider 
things in concreto then it absolutely cannot do without imagination” (LD-W 24:710).2 While one 
can obtain rules from school or borrow them from others, by themselves the rules do not succeed in 
establishing the connection with sensible particulars. If anything, the representations derived from 
the senses resist or even harm the generalist efforts of the understanding. The trouble is that the 
concepts of understanding and the intuitions of sensibility are not relevantly alike to allow for a 
peaceful subsumption of the latter under the former, which creates the quarrel between the two 
faculties (Cf. CPR A133–138.) 
Nevertheless, for a cognitive judgment to be possible, the manifold of sensible intuitions 
must be subsumed under a general rule, even if this maneuver violates the particularity of the 
intuition. Now, Kant acknowledges that understanding cannot accomplish this task by itself. While 
understanding can entertain conceptual rules in abstracto, it does not have the ability to apply those 
rules. All it can do is to try to justify the application of the original rule by reference to a new rule, 
and this will only lead to an infinite regress of rules on the application of rules (CPR A133, see CPJ 
5:168–169). Hence, understanding needs help from another faculty, which Kant calls the power of 
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judgment, defining it as the faculty of subsuming sensible particulars under the concepts of 
understanding (CPR A132). The power of judgment lies between the understanding and the 
imagination as a mediator who takes its lead from concrete examples rather than abstract formulas. 
It is, as Kant writes, “a special talent that cannot be taught but only practiced” (CPR A133). 
In the First Critique, the power of judgment does not have much more than a supporting, if 
necessary, role in the formation of cognitive judgments. However, the role of the power of 
judgment in cognition is given a more substantial account in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, 
a work dedicated to the faculty that is supposed to bridge the gap between the conceptual rule and 
its particular instance. There, Kant’s self-appointed task is to show that the power of judgment itself 
belongs to the group of higher cognitive faculties, along with understanding and reason, by 
establishing its a priori principle (CPJ 5:168, 5:177). Only if we can show that the power of 
judgment is such a legitimate peace mediator, can we hope to build a bridge between the conceptual 
yearning of the understanding and the concrete sensible intuitions. In this respect, the overall goal 
of the Third Critique is to show that two quarreling friends may come together in nothing less than 
a harmonious, free play (CPJ 5:217–219). 
 
III. KANT AND THE TWO POLES OF A JUDGMENT OF BEAUTY  
 
The way in which Kant seeks to accomplish his task is by considering judgments that begin with the 
concrete sensible content that does not readily yield to the conceptual requirements of the 
understanding. Kant calls such judgments reflecting, contrasting them with determining judgments 
that proceed in the opposite order from the concept to the particular (CPJ 5:179). A reflecting 
judgment takes up, by means of the imagination, the represented manifold of intuitions for 
consideration without having a concept under which to subsume it ready at hand. For Kant, the 
paradigm example of reflecting judgments is a judgment of beauty, which is merely reflecting as it 
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does not rest on a concept nor leads to one (CPJ 5:211). While in a cognitive judgment I relate the 
representation by means of understanding to the object, in a judgment of beauty I relate the 
representation by means of imagination to my own subjective feeling of pleasure (CPJ 5:203). This 
is to say that the judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment but an aesthetic one (CPJ 5:203). It is 
a judgment whose determining ground is subjective, as it pertains to my personally felt pleasure in 
relation to the represented particular.  
So, when I disinterestedly contemplate the pattern of wall paper, to use Kant’s example of 
a free beauty, my imagination takes up the representation of the sensible intuition and presents it as 
a challenge to the understanding (CPJ 5:229). By this very challenge of a sensible particular defying 
the attempts of the understanding to subsume it under a concept, the imagination launches what 
Kant calls a free play between itself and understanding, subjectively experienced as pleasure (CPJ 
5:217). But for Kant, a judgment of beauty is not merely subjective. While resting on a feeling, the 
judgment of beauty differs significantly from judgments about the agreeable that are merely 
subjective, resulting from empirically induced pleasures I experience when tasting good wine or 
chocolate. Hence, while both judgments of the agreeable and of beauty are aesthetic judgments, as 
they pertain to sensibility in relation to feelings, judgments of beauty carry with them a normative 
claim. I make them with a “universal voice”, I demand “agreement from others” (CPJ 5:216, 
5:213).  
This difference between judgments of beauty and judgments of the agreeable reflects a 
deeper difference in their modality. In a judgment of the agreeable the connection between the 
particular smell or taste and my pleasure is contingent, as it is based on empirical laws of nature. 
However, in a judgment of beauty I claim that the relation between the form of the representation 
and my pleasure is necessary (CPJ 5:236–237). Given that the necessity of a judgment of beauty is 
not based on concepts (required of objective necessity), Kant calls the type of necessity exemplary. 
This is subjective necessity, which is presented as objective under the assumption that we all share 
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the same mental faculties (CPJ 5:237). That is, under the assumption that your faculties too will 
engage in harmonious play when you disinterestedly contemplate the form of the represented 
object. 
It is important to note that while the judgment of beauty does not involve a determinate 
conceptual rule, understanding participates in the judgment according to its own essence, as a 
faculty of rules. Kant writes: 
“Taste, as a subjective power of judgment, contains a principle of subsumption, not of 
intuitions under concepts, but of the faculty of intuitions or presentations (i.e. of the 
imagination) under the faculty of concepts (i.e. the understanding), insofar as the former in 
its freedom is in harmony with the latter in its lawfulness” (CPJ 5:287). 
In a judgment of beauty, imagination is set free from the constraint of determinate concepts. Yet, 
the judgment of beauty “must be able to be universally communicated” even in the absence of a 
concept adequate to capture the sensible content (CPJ 5:217). This requirement of communicability 
makes it important for Kant to sustain the connection to understanding. While the understanding 
does not bring a determinate concept into the judgment, it must still “agree” with the imagination. 
This agreement, occurring in the free play of the faculties, is a subjective yet necessary condition 
for “cognition in general” (CPJ 5:217–218). Accordingly, the pleasure I feel in the judgment and 
indeed in its communicability is not merely an empirical or statistical phenomenon, but expected of 
everyone (CPJ 5:218).3   
So what Kant seeks to do is to get to the bottom of the difference between the subjective 
but normative judgments of beauty and merely subjective judgments about the agreeable. He wants 
to show that in spite of its subjective ground in my personally felt pleasure, I have the right to treat 
judgments of beauty as universally valid and demand agreement from others. And it is not only the 
judgment of beauty that is at stake here. For what Kant is ultimately after is reassurance of our right 
to “think of the particular as contained under the universal” when the fit between the universal, i.e., 
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the concept of understanding, and the particular cannot be justified by appeal to further concepts 
(CPJ 5:179, see 5:169). As I understand it, the goal is to show that a cognitive judgment does not 
have to remain paralyzed in the face of the infinite regress of conceptual rules on the application of 
rules and that the intuition and concept may be united, not by a further rule, but by a feeling of 
appropriateness – a feeling that finds it paradigmatic instance in a judgment of beauty as a merely 
reflecting judgment. For it is precisely the kind of judgment that brings together understanding and 
imagination in a nonconceptual yet normative manner and therefore is, as Kant writes, “requisite for 
possible cognitions in general” (CPJ 5:290). Without such a blind (i.e. nonconceptual) judgment we 
would either launch on the aforementioned infinite regress or else fall back on a naturalistic model 
of cognition that, for Kant, cannot account for the normativity involved in cognition.4 
 
IV. KANT AND THE RULE I CANNOT PRODUCE 
 
So the judgment of beauty makes a claim to necessity in spite of having no conceptual ground. 
Now, in Kant’s system, what grounds a claim to necessity and thereby justifies the normative force 
of the judgment in question is always an a priori principle (CPR A106). In the case of ordinary 
cognitive judgments, the a priori foundation is given in the pure categories of understanding, but 
given Kant’s insistence on the nonconceptuality of a judgment of beauty, such a conceptual 
foundation will not do. What, then, can ground the normative force of the judgment of beauty? 
Kant addresses the question most explicitly in his Antinomy of Taste. Here, the two 
seemingly contradictory statements making up the Antinomy give voice to the two poles of a 
judgment of beauty, the subjective and the normative. The thesis claims that “The judgment of taste 
is not based on concepts, for otherwise it would be possible to dispute about it (decide it by means 
of proofs)”; whereas the antithesis insists that “The judgment of taste is based on concepts, for 
otherwise, despite its variety, it would not even be possible to argue about it (to lay claim to the 
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necessary assent of others to this judgment)” (CPJ 5:338). According to Kant, the resolution to the 
seeming contradiction arises from the insight that the term “concept” is used in two different senses 
in the thesis and antithesis. While the thesis assumes that the concept would have to be a 
determinate conceptual rule (already excluded by Kant’s analysis), the thesis correctly 
acknowledges that the universal validity of a judgment of beauty (also taken for granted by Kant) 
stands in need of some kind of a ground. Hence, Kant proposes the following resolution: 
“The judgment of taste must be related to some sort of concept, for otherwise it could not 
lay claim to necessary validity for everyone at all. But it need not on that account be 
demonstrable from a concept, because a concept can be either determinable or else in itself 
indeterminate and also indeterminable” (CPJ 5:339).  
Kant’s point is that the concept involved in a pure judgment of taste is not a determinate concept 
that corresponds to the objective predicates of the sensible intuition. Rather, the concept providing 
the necessary ground for the universal validity of the judgment, is a concept that is “in itself 
indeterminate and also indeterminable” (CPJ 5:339).  
Kant’s own explication of this conclusion is likely to obscure rather than explain the 
matter, because he explains the notion of an indeterminable concept by connecting it to the 
“transcendental concept of reason of the supersensible” (CPJ 5:339). Henry Allison has argued that 
the indeterminable concept in question is the concept of beauty itself. Beauty is, as Kant states, 
“nothing by itself, without relation to the feeling of the subject” (CPJ 5:218).5 It is not a property of 
the object even if the surface grammar of statements about beauty makes it look like one (CPJ 
5:187, 5:228). This is to say that the concept of beauty is neither a determinate nor a determinable 
concept. Rather, the judgment of beauty is a judgment about the necessary relation between the 
form of the representation and my feeling of pleasure to which the purposiveness of the 
representation for the faculties of imagination and understanding gives rise. Hence, Allison argues 
that the indeterminable concept in question is beauty itself understood in accordance with Kant’s 
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definition given at the end of the Third Moment. There Kant states: “Beauty is the form of the 
purposiveness of an object, insofar as it is perceived in it without representation of an end” (CPJ 
5:236).6  
It is here, in the notion of purposiveness, that we find the connection between reflecting 
judgment and the notion of a rule. For purposiveness, according to Kant, is “the causality of a 
concept with regard to its object”, meaning that the conceptual rule grounds the possibility of the 
object (CPJ 5:220). Moreover, Kant argues that we can recognize purposiveness even when there is 
no purpose expressible by reference to a determinate concept. For we can notice the purposiveness 
of a form subjectively, by reflection, rather than objectively by means of a concept (CPJ 5:192, 
5:220). This means to see the object as if it were arranged in accordance with the representation of a 
rule even when we cannot state what that rule is. And this is precisely what happens when we make 
a judgment of beauty: while there is no purpose explicable by reference to a determinate concept, 
the manifold of intuitions judged to be beautiful still has the form of purposiveness, as if there were 
a rule grounding the possibility of the object. Given that in the judgment of beauty I judge the 
purposiveness of the form of the object subjectively and not objectively by means of concepts, the 
standard to which I refer arises with the judgment itself. I judge my own response to the form to be 
universally communicable. In other words, I offer my judgment of beauty “as an example of a 
universal rule which one cannot produce” (CPJ 5:237).  
Indeed, Kant connects the very conceivability of the object to its purposiveness by writing: 
“An object or a state of mind, or even an action … even if its possibility does not necessarily 
presuppose the representation of an end, is called purposive merely because its possibility can only 
be explained and conceived by us insofar as we assume as its ground a causality in accordance with 
ends; i.e. a will that has arranged it so in accordance with a representation of a certain rule” (CPJ 
5:220). Given that purposiveness carries with it a reference to such intentional causality, Kant’s 
mention of the supersensible becomes understandable. For the kind of causality in question 
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corresponds to Kant’s notion of freedom understood in the sense of self-determination, presupposed 
to make sense of rational action (cf. G 4:446–447, 4:452).  
Now, the form of purposiveness is not a property of the object, but arises from the power 
of judgment itself in its reflective use governed by its a priori principle of formal purposiveness 
(CPJ 5:183). This principle governs the way in which we must approach certain objects for them to 
be intelligible for us, as if they contained a lawful unity, even if we cannot establish such unity from 
the conceptual perspective of the understanding. Indeed, Kant defines the aesthetic power of 
judgment both as a faculty for judging formal purposiveness and as a “special faculty for judging 
things in accordance with a rule but not in accordance with concepts” (CPJ 5:194). But this just 
means that there is kind of a rule involved in the judgment of beauty. It is just that this rule cannot 
be conceptual, dictated by an external authority (like the understanding), but is given in the 
exemplary instances of judgments of beauty. The judgments themselves are given as rules that one 
cannot produce in the form of conceptual reformulations, but yet acquire their normative force as 
rules from the principle of purposiveness that grounds the legitimacy of their claim to necessity. 
 
V. KANT ON THE RULES OF ART 
 
The two poles of rule-governedness and freedom from rules are echoed in Kant’s discussion of the 
arts. Kant writes: “In a product of art one must be aware of it as art, and not nature; yet the 
purposiveness of its form must still seem to be as free from all constraint of arbitrary rules as if it 
were a mere product of nature” (CPJ 5:306). To be perceived as a work of art, an object must be 
seen as the result of rational consideration and in this sense as if designed in accordance with the 
representation of a rule. Hence, according to Kant, “every art presupposes rules which first lay 
down the foundation by means of which a product that is to be called artistic is first represented as 
possible” (CPJ 5:307). Moreover, it is precisely rational consideration, i.e., the ability of the human 
13 
 
will to escape determination caused by external stimuli and act on the basis of a representation of a 
rule, which establishes art’s connection to freedom. In Kant’s words, “[b]y right, only production 
through freedom, i.e., through a capacity for choice that grounds its actions in reason, should be 
called art” (CPJ 5:303). Without the formal connection to intentional causality, cashed out by Kant 
in terms of representations of rules serving as reasons, the works of art would be mere products of 
nature. At the same time, their freedom from particular, conceptually determinable purposes makes 
them suitable for conceptually indeterminable judgments of taste.7 
In accordance with his analysis of a judgment of beauty that manifests exemplary 
necessity, Kant describes the rules involved in great products of art as exemplary. Just like one 
cannot make a judgment of beauty by relying on rule-formulations, one cannot learn how to write 
inspired poetry by imitating others or by consulting a manual. Nevertheless, like the judgment of 
beauty that is offered as an example of a rule, so too the rule of art is meant to serve “as a standard 
or rule for judging” (CPJ 5:308). The rule of art “cannot be couched in a formula to serve as a 
precept […] rather, the rule must be abstracted from the deed”, from the work of art that is (CPJ 
5:309). The work “discloses a new rule, which could not have been deduced from any antecedent 
principles or examples” (CPJ 5:317). One way to understand this is to take the rule of art to be 
constitutive for the possibility of the work to be a work of art, but not responsible to a conceptual 
standard external to itself. “The concept of beautiful art”, Kant writes, “does not allow the judgment 
concerning the beauty of its product to be derived from any sort of rule that has a concept for its 
determining ground” (CPJ 5:307). Yet, while works of art do not convey a determinate conceptual 
thought, they still must meet the “requirements of the understanding for coherence and 
communicability” (Allison 2001, 284–285). They meet them precisely because they manifest 
features that allow for the kind of interplay between understanding and imagination felt as pleasure 
that we claim others ought to feel too.  
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In addition to the “rule of art”, Kant also mentions the rules of art in plural, speaking of 
“academic correctness” and “training” necessary for the elaboration of the raw material provided by 
the genius. In this context, it is safe to assume that by the rules of art Kant means the conventions of 
a given field of art, presumably open to conceptualization as well. 8 He writes, “There is no beautiful 
art in which something mechanical, which can be grasped and followed according to rule, and thus 
something academically correct, does not constitute the essential condition for art. For something in 
it must be thought of as an end, otherwise one cannot ascribe its product to any art at all; it would be 
a mere product of chance” (CPJ 5:310). So even Kant acknowledges the artworks rely on a tradition 
of rules, even if they should do that “without the academic form showing through” (CPJ 5:307). 
To sum up, in cognitive judgments the imagination is constrained by the concepts of the 
understanding, but in artistic production “the imagination is free to provide, beyond the concord 
with the concept, unsought extensive material for the understanding” (CPJ 5:314, 5:317). Moreover, 
as Kant has shown, the step outside the bounds of conceptual thinking does not entail that artworks 
or the corresponding judgments of beauty are “original nonsense” or hopelessly subjective 
impressions with no lawfulness involved (CPJ 5:308). Given that the power of judgment brings its a 
priori principle of formal purposiveness into the judgment, the claim to necessity made by the 
judgment of beauty is as justified as the conceptual necessities we encounter in the realm of 
cognition. Similarly, works of art may be seen as manifesting the form of purposiveness which 
grounds their communicability.  
 
VI. WITTGENSTEIN ON THE TWO POLES OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT 
 
At this point one may justifiably think that while Kant has given us good reasons to treat judgments 
of beauty as normative and hence evoking the need for a standard for that normativity, the 
philosophical price for adopting his view is simply too high. After all, Kant’s argument relies 
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heavily on his fixed architecture of transcendental faculties. However, we find a version of the 
argument in Wittgenstein’s later remarks on aesthetics that incorporate some of Kant’s central 
concerns but do so without relying on faculty talk. It is to Wittgenstein’s formulation of the 
normativist insight in aesthetics that I will now turn. 
In accordance with Kant’s overall project to determine the limits of different types of 
judgments marked by their respective sets of rules, Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus that “only 
connexions that are subject to law are thinkable” (TLP 6.361). For the early Wittgenstein, the 
relevant laws are grounded in the logical form of language and reality, known to the subject a priori 
as the form of her thought (TLP 2.17, 3.03, 5.473–5.4733).9 While the later Wittgenstein rejects the 
Tractarian view of the universal and immutable logical form, he nevertheless continues to treat rules 
of grammar as the shared foundation for communication (TLP 2.022, 2.026; PI §§ 142, 240). 
Without the contextual interconnections provided by the rules, constitutive of our language games, 
an expression “may be anything or nothing” at all (PI §§ 6, 371).  
Moreover, the understanding of language requires more than mere conformity to a 
mechanism of rules; it requires the speaker’s familiarity with the rules of grammar and her ability to 
justify her linguistic utterances by appeal to those rules (PI §§ 184–217, 531). If this were not the 
case, then it would make no sense to talk about understanding, which for Wittgenstein is a 
normative notion standing in need of a criterion to distinguish it from misunderstanding. However, 
like Kant, Wittgenstein notes that justifications given by explicit rule-formulations lead to an 
infinite regress (PI § 201; CPR A133).10 Hence, the account of linguistic communication given 
exclusively by means of rule-formulations has its limits. Wittgenstein writes: “Once I have 
exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to 
say: ‘This is simply what I do.’” (PI § 217). 
Like Kant, Wittgenstein extends his emphasis on rules to his treatment of aesthetics. If I 
did not know the rules of harmony and counterpoint, he states, I would not understand music, but 
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would be like a dog wagging its tale when hearing music (LC I:17). My response to music would be 
“pathological” in the Kantian sense of being merely empirically conditioned (CPJ 5: 209; M 9:34). 
In 1933, Wittgenstein makes the point by reference to the Kantian distinction between the agreeable 
and the beautiful.11 He begins by rejecting the account of beauty as a property of objects, i.e., an 
essence shared by all things we call beautiful, and goes on to distinguish between two kinds of 
judgments as follows: 
“[1] you are calling a smell beautiful; & can say no more than ‘I like the smell of 
lilac’, ‘I don’t care particularly about it’ 
[2] you are talking about arrangement of flowers in a bed: here you can say much 
more” (M 9:13). 
According to Wittgenstein the term “beautiful” is used in quite different senses in the two examples. 
He argues that if the judgment [1] only means that the smell causes a pleasant sensation, then we 
are dealing with a question of experience: either the smell causes the pleasant sensation or it does 
not. However, according to Wittgenstein, judgment [2] indicates more, namely, that “you enjoy the 
shape, in the sense in which the shape enters into the enjoyment” (M 9:14). According to 
Wittgenstein, the nature of enjoyment is different in the two cases. In the case of a good smell, the 
enjoyment is merely “angenehm” (agreeable), induced causally and a matter of mere experience. 
But in the case of appreciating the arrangement of flowers in a bed, the judgment itself is “Lust-
betont”. The pleasure is not merely accompanying the sensation, but rather characterizes or 
accentuates the judgment of beauty. In this respect, beauty resembles desires, motives, and fears 
that have a grammatical rather than a causal relation to their object. (M 9:14; LC II:18.) 
Wittgenstein says: “The question in Aesthetics is not: Do you like it? But, if you do, why do you? 
[…] If we ever come to: I like this; I don’t, there is an end of Aesthetics; & then comes psychology” 
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(M 9:26). The point is that a mere subjective feeling of pleasure in the face of a sensible 
representation does not yet count as a proper judgment of beauty. 
Wittgenstein’s own examples of agreeableness resonate with those of Kant. He uses the 
term in relation to tastes of food and smells (M 9: 6; 9:13–9:26; LC II: 3). Most importantly, in 
accordance with Kant, Wittgenstein denies that such feelings of agreeableness are essential for 
proper aesthetic judgments. He says: “So to say King Lear is ‘agreeable’ is like saying a chair has a 
smell. King Lear is very a complex experience, & this is about the least important thing you could 
say about it” (M 9:16). Interestingly, Wittgenstein illustrates the difference between agreeableness 
and beauty by another example, which directly echoes Kant’s formalism and mistrust of colours as 
potentially beautiful things. Wittgenstein says: “If I say of a flower ‘Isnt’s this a marvellous 
colour?’ I mean something quite different from if I shew a painted pattern, where it may mean ‘is 
good for a wall-paper’” (M 9:16). Now, for Kant, wall-paper exemplified a free beauty, perfectly 
suited for a judgment of beauty free from concepts as well as from such sensuous contents that 
would influence us in a pathological, merely causal manner. Kant’s point was that the object of free 
contemplation that could result in a judgment of beauty should be form that is independent of 
“charms and emotions”. The same autonomy of beauty is clearly at stake for Wittgenstein as well, 
who says, evoking yet again the example of wall-paper: 
“… writing a good accompaniment; designing a good door; choosing a suitable wall-paper.  
Suppose you find a bass too heavy – that it moves too much; you aren’t saying: If it moves 
less, it will be more agreeable to me. That it should be quieter is an end in itself, not a 
means to end.” (M 9:20.) 
While the agreeable pertains to smells and tastes and may be captured by empirical 
generalizations, for Wittgenstein, aesthetic investigation is not psychological or corroborated by 
empirical evidence (M 9:18–41; LC II: 1–3, 34–38, III:7–8). Rather, just like Kant, who writes 
about someone confusing the agreeable with the beautiful that “he must not call it beautiful if it 
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pleases merely him”, so too Wittgenstein assumes that the language of beauty is normative. In 1933, 
Wittgenstein expresses the point as follows: “When I say ‘This bass moves too much’ I don’t 
merely mean ‘It gives me such & such an impression’, because If I did I should have to be content 
with the answer ‘It doesn’t give me that impression” (M 9:28). But we are not content with that. As 
Wittgenstein later points out, in aesthetics we make claims as in a court of law, claims that call for 
reasons even when we have been deprived of the conceptual resources to which appeal in justifying 
the judgment (LC III:11–12; M 9:32).  
As in the case of language, we hold the speaker accountable for her aesthetic judgments 
and require that he give us reasons for his judgments (LC III:12). Indeed, Wittgenstein follows 
Kant in assuming that there is an important contrast between causes and reasons, corresponding to 
the contrast between empirical explanations and intentional or “grammatical” explanations (TLP 
4.111; PI §§ 90, 109; cf. CPJ 5:386-8).12 Hence, Wittgenstein’s repeated remarks on the centrality of 
notions such as “correct”, “right”, and “necessary” in aesthetics (LC I:8; M 9:18–9:19; CV, 65). 
However, in accordance with Kant’s emphasis on the nonconceptuality of judgments of beauty, 
Wittgenstein suggests that aesthetic reasons are not typically given by explicit rule-formulations. In 
fact, in the Philosophical Investigations, he brings up the understanding of music and poetry as 
examples that do not allow for a conceptual reformulation (PI § 531). Yet, as cases of 
understanding, they require some criteria of correctness to distinguish them from mere empirically 
induced reactions. But if the rules that serve to distinguish the realm of art from the realm of the 
agreeable are not primarily conceptual rule-formulations, then whence do my aesthetic judgments 
acquire their normative force? In my reading, this very question underlies Wittgenstein’s focus on 
reason-giving in aesthetics (see M 9:30–9:50).  
To be sure, in describing aesthetic systems, like music, poetry, tailoring, or architecture, 
Wittgenstein evokes such “academic” rules as the rules of harmony and counterpoint, poetic meters, 
and the rules of tailoring that may be conceptually formulated. These lay down the background 
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against which we call certain aesthetic choices “correct”, “right”, “wrong”, and “necessary”. But to 
explain why a certain note, say, is necessary in a given musical context is not as straightforward as 
merely appealing to Theory of Harmony. Wittgenstein says: 
“In the case of the word ‘correct’ you have a variety of related cases. The first is when you 
learn the rules. The cutter learns how long a coat is to be, how wide the sleeve must be, etc. 
He learns the rules – he is drilled – as in music you are drilled in harmony and 
counterpoint. Suppose I went in for tailoring and I first learnt all the rules, I might have, on 
the whole, two sorts of attitude: (1) Lewy says: This is too short.” I say: “No. It is right. It 
is according to the rules.” (2) I develop a feeling for the rules. I interpret the rules. I might 
say: “No. It isn’t right. It isn’t according to the rules.” Here I would be making an aesthetic 
judgment about the thing which is according to the rules in sense (1). On the other hand, if 
I hadn’t learnt the rules, I wouldn’t be able to make the aesthetic judgment. In learning the 
rules you get more and more refined judgment. Learning the rules actually changes your 
judgment.” (LC I:15.) 
Here, we find Wittgenstein discussing the basis of the normativity of aesthetic judgment in a way 
that does justice both to the idea of rules as the condition of understanding and to the idea that my 
relation to the rules is also a matter of developing feeling, something that lies at the core of aesthetic 
judgment (cf. TLP 6.45; PI § 535). Moreover, it is this moment of relying on one’s feeling rather 
than a rule-formulation that marks the boundary of conceptual justifications in aesthetics.  
In the first case of aesthetic correctness, discussed by Wittgenstein, I have mastered the 
rules as an apprentice and know, say, how the bass line typically works in a piece of music. And 
acquiring such mastery involves imitation and reliance on rule-formulations. In the second case, 
however, I may acknowledge that while there is no clear mistake, the performance still does not 
satisfy me: “Does this harmonize? No. The bass is not quite loud enough. Here I want something 
different” (LC I:19). This second judgment rests on a subjective response, which Wittgenstein calls 
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an “aesthetic reaction”, to the use to which the musical rules have been put (LC II:10). Such 
responses to “aesthetic puzzlements” as Wittgenstein calls them, cannot be justified by appeal to 
rule-formulations, nor learnt by mere imitation.  
Yet, as the above discussion shows, aesthetic reactions as understood by Wittgenstein are 
not mere empirically conditioned reactions either. While the judgment relies on my feeling of 
dissatisfaction and expresses my personal preference, it is not disconnected from the system of 
music constituted by its musical rules. Rather, the discomfort or satisfaction I experience is, as 
Wittgenstein states, “directed” and the relevant explanation is “grammatical” (LC II:17–18). This is 
to say that the rule-governed system of music itself and my mastery of the rules provides the 
necessary background for my developing feeling. Accordingly, while I can conceptually explain 
why a melody written in a medieval mode comes to a close by saying that it reaches the tonic, 
hearing the melody as a complete whole also requires that I have learnt to “feel the ending of a 
church mode as an ending” (PI § 535, see M 9:41). This change of perspective corresponds to 
Kant’s shift from the determining use of the power of judgment to its reflective use where, instead 
of representing the purposiveness of the melody objectively by reference to the concept of the tonic, 
I represent it on a merely subjective ground (cf. CPJ 5:192).13  
So we find the two poles of a judgment of beauty – the freedom from conceptual rules and 
the quest for a rule to ground the possibility of communication – also in Wittgenstein’s treatment of 
aesthetics. In the Brown Book, Wittgenstein notes, giving voice to the pleasurably frustrated 
yearning for a rule: 
The same strange illusion which we are under when we seem to seek something which a face 
expresses whereas, in reality, we are giving ourselves up to the features before us – that same 
illusion possesses us even more strongly if repeating a tune to ourselves and letting it make its 
full impression on us, we say “This tune says something”, and it is as though I had to find 
what it says. And yet I know that it doesn’t say anything such that I might express in words or 
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pictures what it says. And if, recognizing this, I resign myself to saying ‘It just expresses a 
musical thought’, this would mean no more that saying “It expresses itself”. (BB, 166). 
Put in Kantian terms, Wittgenstein’s phrase “it is as though I had to find out what it says” is the 
voice of the understanding, longing for a conceptual explanation of the content of the theme. The 
“yet I know that I cannot find a verbal or pictorial expression for what it says” is the insistence of 
the imagination on the irreducibility of the sensible manifold of the musical tune to something else. 
And yet this as if -quality of seeming to say something is of crucial importance for the judgment of 
beauty. My experience of the tune as if communicating something demands agreement from others 
even when I cannot explain what it is that it communicates.  
Wittgenstein says: “People sometimes say that we choose course which gives us least pain 
or most pleasure: but they don’t really here mean that it is a question of experience: they mean that 
it must be so, i.e. that it is a tautology, & yet that it has some meaning” (M 9:18; see also NB 40). 
Wittgenstein’s use of the term tautology is particularly interesting in this context. According to his 
early work Tractatus, tautologies are propositions that lack sense, given that they dot depict 
empirical states of affairs. Yet, tautologies are not nonsensical either. This is because while the 
representational relations between a tautology and reality “cancel one another”, tautologies still 
have the form of sense – a prerequisite for sense proper. Moreover, by contrast to ordinary 
sentences that are always capable of being true and capable of being false, tautologies are 
necessarily true. (TLP 4.46–4.4661.)  
What for Kant grounds the normative force of a judgment of beauty is the a priori 
principle of the power of judgment. Kant seeks to establish the status of the power of judgment as a 
faculty that belongs to the group of higher cognitive faculties, thereby showing that reflecting 
judgments, even when they are nonconceptual, can make a rightful claim to exemplary necessity. 
Now, for the later Wittgenstein, the rules of language and art are neither fixed nor anchored in an 
architecture of transcendental faculties. Nor can they be justified by reference to something beyond 
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the linguistic or aesthetics system itself (PI §§ 198–199, 208–210, 497). Even when we treat a rule 
as “unshakeably certain” and as conditioning the possibility of communication, it derives its status 
as a certainty from the use to which it is put in our language (RFM III:39). In this respect, 
Wittgenstein’s version of the argument for the normative character of aesthetics is less demanding 
than Kant’s, as it locates the rules in the culturally and historically variable practices themselves 
(LC I:16, 22, 26–31).  
Nevertheless, as I have argued, Wittgenstein joins Kant in claiming that judgments of 
beauty differ from judgment of the agreeable and that because of this aesthetic investigation cannot 
be empirical. Moreover, given that aesthetic judgment relies not only on one’s familiarity with the 
rules constitutive of the artistic practices but also on one’s feeling, it cannot be exhaustively 
captured by conceptual rule-formulations. Instead, when I claim that the bass moves too much, I am 
offering my own judgment as a normative statement. There is no conceptual explanation of the 
content of art available either. As in the case of a musical tune, where I ultimately “resign myself to 
saying” that it expresses itself, I simply treat the works of art as meaningful (BB, 166). In other 
words, I treat them as instances of rules that have been put to use without a further explanation of 
what that use is supposed to be. 
While Wittgenstein does not appeal to transcendental faculties in explaining the grounds 
for the normative force of aesthetic judgment, his way of characterizing reason-giving in aesthetics 
evokes a version of Kant’s idea of formal purposiveness. However, in Wittgenstein’s account, the 
purposiveness resides in the aesthetic systems themselves. Given that aesthetic explanations cannot 
appeal to a standard outside the aesthetic system itself, the kinds of reasons given in aesthetics take 
the form of further descriptions and comparisons. Aesthetic descriptions do not explain the 
phenomenon by appeal to a further realm, like psychology, but aim at showing how the pieces of an 
aesthetic puzzle may “click into place”: 
23 
 
One asks such a question as “What does this remind me of?” or one says of a piece of 
music: “This is like some sentence, but what sentence is it like?” Various things are 
suggested; one thing, as you say, clicks (LC III:1). 
In the case of aesthetic discomfort about a musical performance, such clicking may be 
accomplished, for example, by making the bass line stronger and thereby rendering the musical 
performance more balanced (LC I:19). Or in the case of architecture, by making the door higher so 
that it fits with its surroundings (LC II:11). The kind of clicking in question – and indeed the very 
possibility of there being an aesthetic puzzle in the first place – relies on there being an aesthetic 
system that constituted by its own autonomous rules that are not responsible to anything over and 
above themselves (M 7:2; PI § 497). Still, the rule-governed system as a whole allows for the kind 
of a perspective that shows a certain aesthetic choice as purposive in its context, experienced as the 
“clicking”. It allows us to see unity in a manifold, to put the point in Kantian terms.  
But again, given that my judgment rests on my own feeling arising as a response to the 
formal purposiveness of the aesthetic system, I cannot force another to adopt it. For you may not be 
satisfied by the reasons I offer for my judgment (M 9:30–9:31, 9:39). You may not see the 
connections that I see within the system or feel the ending of a church mode as an ending. Hence, 
even when I have explained my aesthetic judgment by further descriptions and by pointing to new 
connections within the aesthetic system, in the end you must make the judgment for yourself. 
Wittgenstein says: “A solution must speak for itself. If when I’ve made you see what I see, it 
doesn’t appeal to you, there is an end” (M 9:31; see CV, 79). 
Finally, like Kant, Wittgenstein connects the above account of aesthetic judgment to the 
point at which one cannot produce a new rule-formulation to justify one’s application of the 
grammatical rule. In the Philosophical Investigations, he distinguishes between two ways of 
understanding of sentence, where the first is manifest in the speaker’s ability to provide another 
sentence which says the same, but the second is more like the understanding of a musical theme 
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which cannot be replaced by any other (PI § 531). In 1933, Wittgenstein states explicitly that we 
may approach grammar either “discursively”, i.e. as a calculus that may be taught to another, or 
“intuitively”, taking in the grammatical system “as a whole” (M 8:58). The latter approach, while 
clearly still connected to the rule-governed structure of the grammatical system, does not allow for a 
conceptual analysis, but focuses instead on achieving “a surveyable representation” of the 
grammatical system that “produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing 
connections’” (PI § 122). Seeing such a synoptic overview, Wittgenstein claims, gives rise to 
“immediate pleasure” that satisfies our “aesthetic craving” in a way in which a conceptual 
explanation of an empirical hypothesis can never satisfy us (M 9:38–9:39).  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The overarching ethos of our own time is the appraisal of propositional knowledge as the primary 
form of encounter with the world. But if Kant and Wittgenstein are correct, knowledge itself 
involves a blind spot which resides in the moment of bringing together conceptual rules and their 
concrete applications. This blind spot cannot be filled by an appeal to conceptual resources. Hence, 
Kant argues that the principle of taste – the principle of formal purposiveness, revealed by his 
analysis of a judgment of beauty as a merely reflecting judgment – is “requisite for possible 
cognitions in general” (CPJ 5:290). Without the sense of purposiveness we feel in judgments of 
beauty that rely on our imagination as much as they rely on understanding, our discursive thought 
will remain paralyzed. But even when I judge purposiveness subjectively, based on my feeling 
rather than a determinate concept, I take my judgment to be universally communicable and 
accordingly in need of a common standard. This standard Kant locates in the power of judgment 
itself, whose a priori principle grounds the legitimacy of my judgment as an example of a rule.  
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We find the same pattern of thought in Wittgenstein’s later work. The possibility of 
communication stands in need of shared criteria to distinguish understanding from 
misunderstanding. While Kant locates the criteria in our mental faculties, for Wittgenstein they 
reside in the rules of grammar. And what counts as a reason for me, ought to count as a reason for 
others as well. Yet, in my attempt to justify the application of a known rule to a particular case, “my 
reasons will soon give out” (PI § 211). Instead of rule-formulations, my understanding then relies 
on a feeling of appropriateness. This feeling, paradigmatically exemplified by judgments of beauty, 
is as indispensable for understanding as my familiarity with the conventional rules of a system, 
whether grammatical or aesthetic (PI §§ 531–532). To explain this subjective pole of my judgment I 
can only offer descriptions and comparisons that aim at showing how the pieces of the aesthetic 
puzzle click into place. In doing so I am not merely reporting my private impressions, for I claim 
that a certain aesthetic choice in its context is necessary. Yet, as I cannot explain the necessity I 
aesthetically experience by appealing to a standard external to the aesthetic system itself, I offer my 
own judgment as a rule. This rule derives its normative force from the surveyable representation of 
the system as a whole, i.e., from the system judged reflectively. 
The common core of the arguments offered by Kant and Wittgenstein is that the 
acknowledgement of the freedom of judgments of beauty from conceptual constraints does not 
entail that the notion of a rule is dispensable from our account of aesthetics. What it does entail, 
however, is the need to understand the very notion a rule in a sense broader than one of a 
determining, conceptual rule. For if we give up the notion of a rule as essential for aesthetics and 
art, we run the risk of losing the normativity of the language of beauty. And more, if Kant and 
Wittgenstein are right, in losing that normativity we lose communicability. If there is no common 
standard – not even one as empty of empirical content as the principle of formal purposiveness – 
then our responses to works of art are no more than random likes or dislikes. And the works of art, 
they may be “anything or nothing at all” (PI § 6).14 
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1 On concepts as rules, see Ginsborg 1997, 48–59. 
2 In the First Critique, Kant defines imagination as “the faculty for representing an object even 
without its presence in intuition. Now since all of our intuition is sensible, the imagination, on 
account of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the 
concepts of understanding, belongs to sensibility” (CPR B151). Intuitions, then, are 
“representations of imagination” (CPJ 5:314). Hence, when Kant in the Third Critique tries to 
establish a truce between imagination and understanding, he is talking about the very problem that 
haunted him already in the First Critique.  
3 See Longuenesse 2006, 200. 
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4 On the role of reflecting judgment in cognition, see Bell 1987; Longuenesse 1998, 163–166; 
Allison 2001, 20–30, 144–159; Ginsborg 1997 & 2006; see also CPJ 1st Intro IV-VI & CPJ §§ 9, 
21, 35.  
5 For an alternative interpretation, see Guyer 1997, 300–307. Guyer argues that Kant should have 
appealed to the harmony of the faculties as the indeterminate concept involved in the solution to the 
antinomy and thus avoided what Guyer sees as an unpersuasive appeal to the supersensible. 
6 Allison 2001, 246–260. 
7 I am not suggesting that the freedom of a judgment of beauty is identical with moral freedom in 
the sense of autonomy Kant identifies with acting based on mere respect for the moral law. 
However, the common core of beauty and practical freedom in the weaker sense of self-
determination resides in the agent’s ability to give the rule to herself, which in turn presupposes 
purposiveness (hence Kant’s mention of actions in CPJ § 10). The difference between the beautiful 
and the good arises from the disinterestedness of the judgment of beauty: practical judgments aim at 
conceptually formulable purposes even when that purpose is the realization of the highest good, as 
in the case of a pure moral judgment.  
8 On the role of determining concepts in judgments of beauty, see Guyer 2006, 182–193. On the 
role of cultural conventions and the compatibility of determining and reflecting judgments of art, 
see Makkreel 2006, 233–244. 
9 For Kantian interpretations of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, see, Stenius 1960; Glock 1992; Moore 
2013; Appelqvist 2016. 
10 This affinity between Wittgenstein and Kant has been noted by Cavell 1965/69; Bell 1987; Glock 
1996, 326; Kukla 2006, 10; McDowell 2009, 110; cf. Savile 1993, 93–95. For an exposition of 
Wittgenstein’s account of blind rule-following in relation to Kant and aesthetic judgment see 
Appelqvist 2017. 
11 On the Kantian features of Wittgenstein’s lectures on aesthetics in 1933; see Appelqvist 2018. 
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12 By “intentional” I do not refer to intentions understood as mental states, but to what Wittgenstein 
calls internal or grammatical relations between reasons and actions. Wittgenstein famously argues 
that such relations should be distinguished from causal relations (PI §§ 475–485). In this respect, 
his view may be read as echoing Kant’s contrast between the domains of nature and freedom. 
13 Rudolf Makreel has argued for a similar two-tier process of achieving aesthetic consensus in 
Kant’s case, see Makkreel 2006, 233–239.   
14 Previous versions of this paper have been presented at the Aesthetics Work Group at the College 
of Charleston (February 23 2016), at the Annual Conference of the Nordic Society of Aesthetics 
(May 26–28 2016), and at the Philosophy Research Seminar at the University of Helsinki (October 
13 2016). I want to thank the members of these events, especially Jonathan Neufeld and Lydia 
Goehr for their helpful feedback. I am also indebted to the Academy of Finland and the Turku 
Institute for Advanced Studies for financial support of my work. 
